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1. SUMMARY: These petitions raise numerous issues relating 
to implied private right of actions under Rule lOb-S, promulgated 
pursuant to§ lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: In 1969, Texas International 
Speedway, Inc. (TIS) filed a registration statement and 
prospectus with the SEC and the Texas State Securities Board. 
TIS's securities offering totalled over $4 million, the proceeds 
of which were to be used to construct an automobile race track. 
One year later, TIS filed a petition for bankruptcy. In 1972, 
petrs in No. 81-1076 filed a class action on behalf of purchasers 
of TIS securities under Rule lOb-S, and a pendant claim pursuant 
to the Texas Securities Act. The factual dispute in the case
0 
~ •~~ 
focused on statements made in the TIS prospectus. The jury ~~ ~-
ultimately found that the prospectus was materially misleading  
to the cost of constructing the speedway and that the defendants 
had failed to disclose the true facts with t }eckless disregard for 
,, 
the truth. Prior to trial, the class compromised its claims ----against the underwriters of the offering and the speedway 
contractor. The remaining ~nts, resps in No. 81-1076, ~ 
apparently are the accounting firm and the accountants who helpedJ.l5 ~ 
- ~'3 
prepare the prospectus. The amounts received in settlement were 
---------------~ 
credited against the judgment eventually obtained by the 
plaintiffs, but the non-settling defendants' cross claims for 
contribu~n were disallowed. 
The CA reversed. The CA first held that a private right of 
action under Rule lOb-S may be implied despite the applicability 
.----r 
of express civil remedies. The CA noted that this question was 
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reserved by the Supreme Court in Blue ChiE StarnEs v. Manor Drug u~ 
Stores, 421 U.SA. 723, 7S2 n. lS (197S)' and Ernst & Ernst v. u.d-, 
Hochfelder, 42S u.s. 18S, 211 n. 31 (1976) . Although recent -s ltJ-6--b' 
decisions by the Supreme Court give substance to the argument 
that no remedy should be implied for actions covered by express 
liability provisions of a statute, this is not a case where the 
court is being asked to create a new judicial remedy. It is well 
established that a private remedy exists under Rule lOb-S. The 
question is thus whether an established remedy may be invoked 
despite the existence of another remedy for the same conduct. 
While §§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act contain limitations and 
requirements not exacted of Rule lOb-S litigants, allowing 
invocation of the Rule lOb-S remedy does not impermissably 
nullify these constraints. The implied remedy under Rule lOb-S 
should not depend on whether the statement relied upon was or was 
7 
not contained in an SEC filing. In this regard, the CA relied on 
wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing CorE·t 
6SO F.2d 342 (CA DC 1980), cert. denied u.s. (1981)~ ~-
Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d S4S (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. ~ 
denied 446 U.S. 946 (1980). 
The CA then examined the elements of a cause of action under 
I• /"""/ if. , . l 
Rule lOb-S. Inter alia, the CA held that the clear and ~ 
~o~vincing ~dence standard ' is required in a Rule lOb-S action. 
\ ._-
The court relied on the fact that the traditional burden of proof ~ 
.J, 
in common-law fraud cases is the clear and convincing standard. 
Next, the CA held that it was error for the DC not to require the 
plaintiffs to demonstrate reliance and causation. 
&A-~ 
Although in~ -J-!'~ 
/J,~~L 
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Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 u.s. 128 
(1972) , the Court relieved the investor in certain circumstances 
of the necessity of providing affirmatively that he relied on the 
prospectus or other representation, it does not eliminate the 
reliance element from a Rule lOb-5 case. Where it is alleged 
that a defendant has made positive misrepresentations of mat~~ 
~ information, proof of reliance by the plaintiff upon the 
misrepresentation is required. On the other hand, where a ~. •-
plaintiff alleges deception by the defendant's nondisclosure of  
material information, the Affiliated Ute presumption obviates the ~~ 
need to prove actual reliance on the omitted information. The ~ 
difference between misrepresentation and nondisclosure cases ~v 
relates only to the whether proof of reliance is a prerequisite 
to recovery (misrepresentation case) or whether proof of 
nonreliance is an affirmative defense (nondisclosure case). The 
CA then held that this case cannot be characterized as a 
nondisclosure case. The defendants did not stand mute in the 
face of a duty to disclose. They undertook instead to disclose 
relevant information in an offering statement now alleged to 
contain certain misstatements of fact and to fail to contain 
other facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances, not misleading. This is not a case in which 
difficulties of proof of reliance require the application of the 
Affiliated Ute presumptions. 
The CA also found that there is a right to contribution in 
Rule lOb-5 actions. The court noted that of the seven express 
civil remedies provided in the federal securities laws, three 
( 
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expressly provide for contribution. A no-contribution rule 
promotes a rush to settlement while contribution provides a more 
equal distribution of justice. 
The CA held that the evidence was insufficient to support 
the jury's finding that the defendants were "sellers" under the 
Texas Securities Act. The Texas Securities Act creates liability 
on the part of any person who offers or sells a security by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact. In Brown v. Cole, 
291 S.W.2d 704 (1956), the Texas Supreme Court defined the term 
"sell" as meaning any act by which a sale is made. Nevertheless, 
in Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), the 
court distinguished Brown v. Cole as a case involving an active 
negotiator whose efforts resulted in the sale. The Stone court 
limited the term "seller" to the actual seller and one who acts 
as an agent for either the buyer or seller. This decision 
effectively limits the Texas Securities Act to those who are 
actively engaged in the sale process and prevents it from 
reaching those who merely participate in preparing an offering. 
There is no evidence that resps in No. 81-1076 participated in 
instigating the actual sales transactions to any member of the 
plaintiff class. The two class representatives testified that 
they purchased TIS securities on the open market and not from the 
corporate issuer. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr in No. 81-680 asks this Court to 
grant cert on the issue of whether an implied remedy exists under 
Rule lOb-S in favor of purchasers of securities who have an 
express remedy under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. In the 
- 6 -
instant case, plaintiffs had a § 11 remedy which they permitted 
to become time-barred. The CA's reasoning assumes it to be the 
proper function of the federal courts to find implied remedies 
where necessary to fill out the statutory scheme. This view has 
been emphatically rejected by this Court in Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979). The most serious problem 
with the decision below, however, is its failure to heed the 
repeated teachings of this Court that federal courts should not 
imply remedies in those instances where express remedies are 
provided by Congress for the same conduct. See, e.g., Northwest 
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, ______ u.s. ____ __ 
(1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 
Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
v. Nationa~ea 
Resps in No. 81-680 argue that 3 CAs, including the court . , .. 
below, have recently concluded that the existence of express 
remedies under the securities laws does no_t preclude the implied 
remedy under Rule lOb-5. See Wachovia Bank, supra; A. H. 
Robbins, supra. Petr does not -cite any decision by any other CA 
adopting a contrary ~ule. Moreover, this Court has held in the 
past that the overlap between Rule lOb-5 and other provisions of 
the federal securities laws is not a reason for excluding the 
Rule lOb-5 remedy. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 
u.s. 453 (1969) (§ 14 of Securities Exchange Act). An implied 
private right of action under Rule lOb-5 is well established. A 
Rule lOb-5 plaintiff must prove facts not necessary for recovery 
under § 11 -- deceit committed with scienter. Second, Rule lOb-5 
- 7 -
applies to all misrepresentations whereas § 11 applies only to 
misstatements in a registration statement. 
Petrs in No. 81-1076 raise five issues. First, petrs 
contend that the proper standard of proof is an important 
question of federal securities law on which a split of authority 
exists among the CAs. Petrs cite to numerous decisions which 
petr asserts holds that the preponderance standard is the 
appropriate standard in a Rule lOb-S action. See Mihara v. Dean 
Whitter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824-25 (9th Cir. 1980) ~ Dzenitz v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, 494 F.2d 168, 171 n. 2 
(lOth Cir. 1974). The determination of the appropriate standard 
of proof requires the balancing of interests in order to allocate 
the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the 
relevant i~portance attached to the ultimate decision. Addington 
v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418, 423 (1979). The possible opprobrium to a 
defendant that may result from an adverse decision clearly falls 
far short of the extraordinary interests that warrant the clear 
and convincing standard of proof. 
Second, petrs argue that the CA's decision conflicts with 
decisions of other CA's with regard to whether petrs bear the 
burden of proving that they relied upon the material 
misrepresentations and half truths contained in the TIS 
prospectus. There is a presumption of reliance whenever the 
defendant's fraudulent conduct affects the market in which the 
plaintiff purchased or sold his securities. Blakie v. Barrack, 
( 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 u.s. 816 
\ 
(1976)~ Herbst v. ITT, 495 F.2d 1308 (2nd Cir. 1974). A 
'' 
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presumption of reliance is justified on the ground that material 
representations and half-truths in a registration statement and 
prospectus are inevitably reflected in a decision of an 
underwriter to market a security and generally in the market 
price of publicly traded securities. It is also justified by the 
impracticalities of proving individual reliance whenever large 
numbers of investors have been defrauded. Petrs also contend 
that the presumption of reliance should apply in cases involving 
half-truths. Half-truths present as severe an evidentiary hurdle 
for a plaintiff as with omissions. Moreover, the omission of a 
material fact from a prospectus creates a half-truth. In the 
case at bar, the jury found that resps had failed to disclose the 
cost of completing the speedway and the financial condition of 
the company. Each of these failures to disclose involves both a 
misrepresentation and an omission. Four CAs have upheld a 
presumption of reliance in cases involving half-truths. See 
Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 558 (1st Cir. 1978): Sharp v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187-189 (3rd Cir. 1981): Chelsea 
Associates v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975): Continental 
Grain v. Pacific Oil Seats, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 411-412 n. 1 (8th 
Cir. 1979). 
Third, petrs contend that the decision below requires the 
plaintiff to bear the burden to prove his own lack of 
culpability. Fourth, petrs ask this Court to resolve whether 
defendant in a Rule lOb-S case should be entitled to a right of 
contribution. In two recent cases, this Court has held that in 
the absence of an express provision for contribution made part of 
- 9 -
a remedial statute, Congress did not intend to give federal 
courts the broad power to fashion a right to contribution. See 
Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., U.S. ------
(1981)~ Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 
u.s. (1981). Finally, petrs contend that the CA ignored a 
controlling decision by the Tex. s. Ct. in favor of a decision by 
a lower Texas court. The court below chose to ignore Brown v. 
Cole and relied on the decision of a middle-level Tex. App. Ct. 
in Stone v. Enstam. Under Texas state law, decisions of the 
Texas civil appeals court are not binding on other courts unless 
the decision has been reviewed by the Tex. S. Ct. Because of its 
no writ history, Stone v. Enstam would not bind another Texas 
appellate court. 
The State of Texas has filed an amicus brief supporting 
petrs' contentions regarding the Texas Securities Act in No. 81-
1076. 
4. DISCUSSION: Only two of the issues raised in these 
petitions can be characterized as substantial. Both parties 
agree that this Court has never decided whether a remedy may be 
implied under Rule lOb-S where an express statutory remedy 
already exists. This Court, however, recently denied review on 
two cases raising this issue. Unlike A. H. Robbins and Wachovia 
Bank, however, there can be no doubt that the plaintiffs in this 
case would have had an action under § 11 of the 1933 Act but for 
their failure to comply with the statute of limitations. In 
Wachovia and A. H. Robbins, there was considerable doubt as to 
whether the express statutory remedies were applicable to the 
- 10 -
challenged transactions. it is at least arguable that 
I 
there is a conflict among the CAs as to whether the preponderance 
or clear and convincing standard applies in a Rule lOb-5 action. 
The cases cited by petr in No. 81-1076 apply the preponderance 
standard, but none rejects the clear and convincing standard. As 
to the reliance/causation issue, the CAs appear to agree that 
reliance is required in a Rule lOb-5 action alleging 
misrepresentations. The problem in this case is merely one of 
characterization. Whether this case should be characterized as 
one involving misrepresentations or nondisclosure would not 
appear to be certworthy. Although the rationale of Radcliff 
certainly calls into question the CA's decision that contribution 
may be allowed in a Rule lOb-5 case, the plaintiffs are hardly 
the proper party to bring this issue to this Court. Unlike petrs 
in No. 81-1076, I find nothing in the CA's opinion that requires 
the plaintiff to prove that he exercised due care. Finally, even 
if the CA improperly applied Texas law, this is not a certworthy 
issue. The decision will have absolutely no effect even on CA 
5's interpretation of the Texas Securities Act if a Texas court 
disapproves the interpretration applied by this decision. 
I recommend a CFR in No. 81-1076, if the Court is interested 





No response has been filed in 81-1076. 
Dunkelman Op in petn. 
No. 81- lo?t. 
Responses have been received. Generally 
they reinforce the conclusion of the 
pool memo that this ·xes«i,BfBxp*U LK 
petition properly presents only one - -issue of arguable certworthiness : Whether -
the "preponderance" or "clear and 
convincing" standard should apply in a 
Rule lOb-5 action. CAS opted for the 
latter. There is a split. 
If the Court grants on this issue--
respondents suggest that it might wish to 
await developments in the circuits--the 
grant should be limited to Question 1. 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
February 19, 1982 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 81-1076 
HUDDLESTON, ET AL. 
v. 
HERMAN AND MACLEAN, ET AL. 









Dunkelman Op in petn. 
. . 
March 26, 1982 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned . : ............... . , 19 .. . 
Submitted ............... . , 19 .. . Announced ............... . , 19 .. . 
HOLD 
FOR 
Burger, Ch. J .... . ....... . ... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
White, J . . ................... . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
HERMAN & MacLEAN 
CERT. 





N POST DI S AFF 
/ ................ . 
·.; ················ 
Blackmun, J .................. !/ . . . . ............... . 
Powell, J ............................................ . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . { . / ................ . 
Stevens, J ........................................... . 
O'Connor, J .................... V ................ . 
MERITS MOTION 
REV AFF G D 
No. 81-680 
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
March 26, 1982 
Court ................... . l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned . · ................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ............... . , 19 .. . Announced ............... . , 19 .. . 
HUDDLESTON 
vs. 






G _/ N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
Burger, Ch. J .................. ~ . . . . ................... . 
v-Brennan, J .................... '/ ................... . 
White, J ............................................ . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Y: ~· .. . . . . .. . .... .. 
Blackmun, J ......................... ~~ ... ~ ... . 
../ Powell, J ............................................ . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .( ................ . 
Stevens, J ......................... ~ ........... . 
O'Connor, J .................... ' .... -1. . ........... . 
No. 81-1076 
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
CHAt.'iBEr-.JS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R WHITE April 1, 1982 
' · 
Re: 
MEl10RANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean 
(Page 11 ) 
I as ked that these cases be reli s ted to de t ermine 
whethe r the grant in 81-1076 should be limited. My o wn 
pr e ference would be to limi t t he grant in that case to 
question 1, the stand~issue, and not extend 
: the grant to any of the o ther four questions. There is 
only a single question in 81-680, the implied right of 
action issue . 
. '· 
CHAM BE~~ 0 F 
;:.·,ltpr.t!ttr ~cnrf c flF~mitdt §titft£!' 
':<' t"' , •. , ,.~ 1n n ( f rl rt -;Jr g =-' ~ ... .... "':,. ~ .. CJ · -:· ~uc ~':" 
JUSTICE BYRON R WHITE April 1, 1982 
. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean 
(Page 11) 
I asked that these cases be reli sted to de ter mine 
whether the grant in 81-1076 should be limited. My own 
preference would be to limit the grant in that case to 
question 1, the standard of proof issue, and not extend 
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Huddleston, et al., v. Herman & MacLean, et. a1., No. 81-1076 
Questions Presented 
1. (No. 81-680) Does an implied cause of action under §lO(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or under §17(a) of the 1933 
Act exist for the benefit of the purchasers of securities who have 
an express remedy under §11 of the Secu~ it~es Act of 1933? ~~~ 
-- tr( 
2. (No. 81-1076) Is the clear and convincing standard the~ 
~ appropriate burden of proof in private §lO(b) actio::;; 
~ 
~ \il0' 
case is determining exactly what the first issue presented is. The 
CA found without discussion, and the cert memo assumed, that "the 
alleged misrepresentations in the prospectus would also warrant a 
131.4-f 
suit Under Sections 11 and 12(2) ." Only one of the four material 
" misrepresentations or omissions in the prospectus, however, clear! 
is an "expertised" statement that gives rise to an express cause o 
action under §11 (a) (4). See 15 u.s.c. §77k (a) (4) (accountant is 
liable for material misstatements only "with respect to the 
statement ... which purports to have been prepared or certified by 
him") (emphasis added). Both parties agree that pltfs had ~o 
complete §11 remedy for the misrepresentations alleged here. 
~ ---- ------------
The parties, amici curiae, and the SG raise and discuss three 
main issues, and this memo will at least briefly analyze each: 
~, it addresses whether a private §lO(b) remedy exists. ~ 
assuming a private §lO(b) remedy exists, it discusses whether the 
action should be limited to remedying violations that are not 
actually actionable under an express remedy. ~, again assuming 
there is a private §lO(b) remedy, the memo will discuss whether 
purchasers of registered securities may pursue their remedy against 
experts under §lO(a) rather than §11. 
Pltfs in the DC also sought relief pursuant to §17(a) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, but the CA did not rely on or address 
§17 (a). Pltfs concede that the existence of an implied cause of 
~~w>- action under that section is not an issue in this case. 
Discussion 
I. Implied Cause of Action 
A. Existence of Section lO(b) Remedy 
1. Precedent. As plaintiffs point out, although ~urt has 
never itself decided the existence of a private §lO(b)~emedy, it 
has, in many opinions, affirmed its existence. See, e. g.,~rnst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 196 (1976) (POWELL, J.) ("well 
established"); ~ue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
730 (1975) (POWELL, J., joining) ("confirmed") (cited in 
Hochfelder); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co • , 4 0 4 U . S . 6 , 13 n . 9 ( 19 71 ) -- _..,. ("It is now established that a 
private right of action is implied under §lO(b) .") (cited in 
Hochfelder). The SG contends that, because the private right of 
action under §lO(b) is so well rooted in federal jurisprudence, the 
Court need not inquire whether that right is congruent with recent 
decisions evaluating other implied remedies. See Touche Ross & Co. 
v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.l9 (1979). Deft, on the other 
hand, suggests that the implied right under §lO(b) is an historical 
anachronism and should be given the usually strict scrutiny given 
any implied right of action. The abbreviated discussion below on 
~he existence of a private §lO(b) action is for your information 
9 ~~ only if you do not feel bound by precedent on this point. Cf. 
~~ v. University of Chicago, 441 u.s. 677, 736 n.6 (1979) 
~~(POWELL, J., dissenting) ("I do not suggest overruling [J.I. Case 
~ Co. v.] Borak[, 377 u.s. 426 (1964)] at this late date .... "). 
1 ~k 2. Legislative Reenactment Doctrine. The "central inquiry" in 
deciding whether a private remedy may be implied is congressional 
intent. 
however, depending whether a court considers new legislation or 
legislation that Congress amended following its enactment. Compare 
Merrill Lynch, 102 S.Ct., at 1839 ("When Congress enacts new 
legislation, the question is whether Congress intended to create a 
private remedy ..•• "}, with id. (" [W]hen Congress acts in a statutory 
context in which an implied private remedy has already been 
recognized by the courts .•• the inquiry ... is whether Congress 
intended to preserve the preexisting remedy."}." 
~ ~ In Merrill Lynch, the Court upheld the implied remedy under an 
~ a~al~s antifraud provision of the Commodity Exchange Act even 
.? ~ Jt' though "the consensus of opinion concerning the existence of a 
~ private cause of action under the CEA was neither as old nor as 
VV overwhelming as the consensus concerning §10 (b} •••• " Id. , at 18 40. 
The SG argues that Congress has reaffirmed the private §lO(b} action 
~
three times in the last twenty years: (1} in the Securities Acts 
Amendments of 1964; (2} in the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975; 
and (3} in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (1977}. On the other 
hand, the Court in Merrill Lynch commented that "no comparable 
legislative approval or acquiescence exists for the Rule lOb-5 
remedy." 102 s.ct., at 1845 n.88. Cf. Aaron v. SEC, 446 u.s. 680, 
694 n.ll (1980} (holding that the legislative consideration of [the 
1975 amendments and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977] do 
not confirm the SEC's construction of §lO(b}}. The legislative 
reenactment doctrine is thus not conclusive, although it could most 
strongly support a finding of "reenactment." See Merrill Lynch, 102 
u.s., at 1846 n.92 ("'The statutes enacted in 1933 and 1934 have 
,. 
' 
been amended so often with full congressional awareness of the 
judicial interpretation of Rule lOb-5 as implicitly creating a 
private remedy that we must now assume that Congress intended to 
create rights for the specific beneficiaries as well as duties to be 
policed by the SEC."') {quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 
Inc., 430 u.s. 1, 55 n.4 {1977) {STEVENS, J., dissenting}}. 
3. Cort Analysis. Pltfs admit that there is no direct 
evidence of congressional intent to create any private remedy under 
§lO{b). See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 u.s., at 729-732, 737. The 
structure of the 1933 Act, including §§16 and 18, 15 u.s.c. §77p,r 
{preserving state and common-law remedies), offer little support 
that Congress intended a private federal remedy to duplicate the 
express remedies. 
4. Conclusion. The Court has generally "assumed" the existence 
~· --~~of a §lO{b) cause of action. See Aaron, 446 u.s., at 689. 
~ ."[W]hether a cause of action exists" is a question the answer to 
· .1/ ........ wh1' ch "may be ~ assumed without being decided." Burks v. Lasker, 441 
~.s. 471, 476 n.S (1979). The Court should do likewise regarding 
t~ VV~he issue whether a private §lO{b} issue exists. 
y.;f 
B. Preemption by Express Remedy 
~ The precise issue on which cert was granted--whether an action 
~ made a violation of the 1933 Act for which an express remedy is 
~~provided may serve as a basis for an imp~ied action under SlO(b) of 
~ the 1934 Act--is one that the Court presumably left open in Blue 
Chip Stamps, 421 u.s., at 733 n.l5, and again in Hochfelder, 425 
u.s., at 211 n.31. The answer to the question is important: section 
lO{b} potentially overlaps with a substantial number of express 
........ ~
,_ 
?i::i:on~~ securities laws, including §§1:: 
and 12(2) of the 1933 Act and §§9(e) and 18 of the 1934 Act. 
1. The Court's Preemption Test. In Blue Chip Stamps, the 
Court acknowledged that when an express remedy is provided the Court 
should be reluctant to find for the same conduct a more expansive 
(< S implied cause of action: "It would indeed be anomalous to impute to 
uJH ~Congress an intention to expand the plaintiff class for a judicially 
~~mplied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for 
~ comparable express causes of action." 421 U.S., at 736. See Touche 
Ross, 442 u.s., at 574 ("(W]e are extremely reluctant to imply a 
cause of action ••. that is significantly broader than the remedy that 
~ Congress chose to provide."). In no~ .. ha:_ t~ Court recognized('RU4if 
~ an imp~lied~a-te S~ where there_w!:' a::'.-..exJ2! ess~dy ~ 
~-~~ ~able under the federal securities laws. This Court, however, 
/ has also emphasized that express remedies do not by themselves 
negate additional implied remedies. See, e. g., Cannon, 441 u.s., 
at 711; Cort v. Ash, 422 u.s. 66, 83 n.l4 (1975). Indeed, many 
§lO(b) actions have arisen from fraudulent conduct associated with 
registered offerings. See 1 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities 
Fraud & Commodities Fraud §§2.4(2), 2.4(4) (1982) (collecting 
cases) • 
Plaintiffs primarily rely on this Court's analysis in 
Hochfelder, which rested in part on the premise that actions under 
~t ,, 
§lO(b) depend on~ precisely because conduct 
actionable under §§11 and 12(2) also is actionable in a private suit 
under §lO(b). See 425 u.s., at 210-211 (citing Fischman v. Raytheon 
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-787 (CA2 1951) (upholding private §lO(b) 
_/ I~ ~---4 11::7 ¢-56--
action by stockh(~u~L~ for fraudulent statements in registration 
statement)). In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 u.s. 453 
{1969) , the Court stated that "the existence or nonexistence of 
regulation under §14 would not affect the scope of §lO{b) and Rule 
lOb-5 •••• The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither 
unusual nor unfortunate." Id., at 468. 
/1 \ 
Pltfs overlook, however, 
that in National Securities the Commission acted pursuant to the 
Court observed that National Securities presented "none of the 
complications which may arise in determining who, if anyone, may 
bring private actions under §lO{b) and Rule lOb-5." 393 u.s., at 
467 n.9. 
It is important to identify what factors will inform any 
judgment whether the existence of express remedies preempt §lO{b) 
remedies. Pltfs argue that the question here is not what the 1934 
Congress intended, but what Congress would intend had it known that 
eight years later the courts would imply a private §lO{b) remedy. 
In Touch Ross, the Court stated that, in implying a right of action, 
"[t]he ultimate question is one of congressional intent[.]" 442 
u.s., at 578. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National 
, Sea Clammers Association, 453 u.s. 1, 13 {1981) {POWELL, J.). It is 
certainly arguable, however, that congressional intent is beside the 
point now, because Congress never intended the §lO{b) remedy in the 
first instance. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 u.s., at 749 {because 
§lO{b) action "has been judicially found to exist," the Court is 
free in "judicially delimit[ing]" it to rely upon "practical 
factors" and "considerations of policy"). See also Merrill Lynch, 
8. 
102 s.ct., at 1846 n.92 {because §lO{b) private remedy must now be 
assumed, defining its scope does not "present the same kind of issue 
discussed in Cort") {quoting Piper, 430 u.s., at 55 n.4 {STEVENS, 
J., dissenting)). Arguably, the Court's task now is to fashion a 
workable federal common-law remedy of fraud that does not completely 
negate congressional intent as manifested in the express statutory 
provisions. See Hochfelder, 425 u.s., at 210 {issue whether an 
implied remedy will "nullify the effectiveness of the carefully 
drawn procedural restrictions on the [] express actions") {footnote 
omitted). 
{a) Merrill Lynch Test. The line of decisions finding no 
preemption since Fischman, 188 F.2d, at 786-787, provide a rule of 
judicial interpretation of §lO{b) that Congress has left undisturbed 
when it has amended the Securities Exchange Act. See Merrill Lynch, 
102 S.Ct., at 1841 n.66 {"'Congress is presumed to be aware of ~ 
[a] .•• judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that/.V~~,~-
interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change ••.• '");~ 
Blue Chip Stamps, 421 u.s., at 733 {observing that congressional~ 
silence on a longstanding judicial interpretation "argues ~ 
significantly in favor of acceptance" of the rule by the Court). 
Deft argues persuasively that Fischman was decided on principles 
that are inconsistent with the development of the law of implied 
~-------------------------~~--~--------------------------
remedies since Cort, but that is similar to JUSTICE POWELL's point 
in Merrill Lynch, 102 u.s., at 1849, to no avail. On the other 
hand, the issue of implied §lO{b) actions is considerably more 
proximate to the matters dealt with in the amendments than is the 
overlap between §lO{b) and §11. Moreover, if Congress were familiar 
9. 
' . 
in 1975 and 1977 with lower court authorities permitting overlapping 
remedies, it should also have known of National Railroad Passenger 
Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 u.s. 453, 
458 {1974) {" [W]hen legislation expressly provides a particular 
remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the 
statute to subsume other remedies."). Thus, while a strong case 
could be made for the doctrine of legislative reenactment in support 
of a private §lO{b) remedy, it is a much weaker case that Congress 
considered the preemption or overlap issue in 1975 and 1977. 
{b) Practical Considerations. There is no evidence that 
Congress intended the express remedy of §11 to provide the exclusive 
method of recovery for investors defrauded in a registered 
securities offering. In §16 of the Securities Act, Congress stated 
that "[t]he rights and remedies provided by this subchapter shall be 
in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist 
""'"' --------- __.. 
...,.r' at law or in equity." See also 15 u.s.c. §78b {purpose of 
j(~ecurities laws is "to impose requirements necessary to make 
[securities] regulation and control reasonably complete and 
effective"). The SG contends that Congress narrowed the reach of 
§11 only because of its appreciation of the greatly expanded 
liability imposed by that section. Once the Court "assumes" the 
existence of a private §lO{b) remedy, it is difficult to "assume" 
that Congress meant for §11 to be an exclusive remedy. 
Moreover, a holding that express remedies restrict the 
availability of remedies under §lO(b) would impose on the federal 
judiciary the burdensome task of making a detailed comparison at the 
threshold of the litigation concerning the relief available to pltf 
i\ 
~"f~~- ftd.S'IJ 10. 
each deft under each potent ial 'ly applicable statutory 
provision. For example, before concluding that a §11 remedy is 
available, the DC would nave to find that the shares purchased by _.....,. ________ - -~~
pltfs were covered by and traceable to the challenged registration 
~~~-· --......._..__-----------------
statement. In cases involving a registered offering of additional 
shares of a previously traded security, tracing of shares purchased 
in the aftermarket back to the registration statement can be an 
extremely difficult task. Here, if there were a dispute whether a 
portion of a registration statement had been "purportedly" prepared 
by deft, the parties would have to litigate that issue before 
reaching the merits. In many cases, the DC would be required to 
make that analysis on the basis of the pleadings. Finally, the 
courts would have to determine which party in a §lO(b) action has 
the burden of proving that pltf does or does not have a §11 remedy. 
c. Elements of §lO(b) Cause of Action {j_5 , 
Even if the Court rejects deft's argument that the actual~
A,..z.,io 
availability of express remedies precludes implied remedies, the~ 
existence of ~xpress remedies is not irrelevant when discuss~w~ 
may bring a §lO(b) action, who may be sued, and what elements he ~L~.( · 
must prove. 
~---
1. Who May Sue. Where the Court has previously addressed 
issue of who may assert a recognized implied remedy, it has 
gl'-" p emphasized the i~~~g whether the claimant~ 
~ ,2within the class of persons for whose "especial" benefit the statute 
~~ wa~Piper, 430 U.S., at 37 (denying to a tender 
~ ~vr 
offeror the right to assert a claim for private relief under 
§lO(b)): Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 733-736 (denying to a 
11. 
nonpurchaser offeree of registered securities the right to sue under 
§lO(b)). Deft argues that the structure of the Securities Act, and 
the circumstances of its enactment, preclude the possibility that 
Congress intended to make purchasers of securities in registered 
offerings the special beneficiaries of §lO(b). But see Blue Chip 
Stamps, 421 u.s., at 733-734 (indicating purchasers are the 
beneficiaries of §lO(b)). There are three objections, however, to 
precluding purchasers of registered securities from pursuing a 
remedy under §lO(b). ~t, the language of the provision does not 
That 
by the 
~elegation of authority to the SEC to prescribe rules necessary for 
~p/1'- the protection of "investors." Second, the section comprehends 
transactions involving any type of security: securities purchased 
pursuant to a registration statement are not excluded. Third, the 
suggested approach practically eliminates the utility of the private 
§lO(b) action, taking away what the precedents implying the action 
purport to give. Thus, this approach is intellectually 
unsatisfying, regardless what one thinks of private §lO(b) actions. 
In sum, the all-inclusive language of this provision does not easily 
permit the Court to carve out an exception for defrauded purchasers 
or sellers of registered securities once an implied action is found. 
2. Who May Be Sued. Unlike the ~issuer of the security, the 
~igners of the registrations statement, the~irectors of the issuer, 
and the~nderwriters, who are liable for material inaccuracies in 
the whole of the registration statement, see 15 u.s.c. §77k (a) (1), 
tl ~' 
(2), (3) & (5), section 11 (a) (4) effectively allows accountants and 
........ -
· ~wr 
other experts to define for themselves t~eadth of their §11 
12. 
liability: An accountant is liable only for statements that 
----------~ - -
"purport[] to have been prepared or certified by him." It would 
seem that the Court could say that accountants and other experts 
~7U~~~~~~~~~ 
cannot be sued under §lO(b) for aRy se et~n o 
_ '~statement: any remedy for misstatements must come under §ll(a) (4). 
f~· This approach, however, may be precluded by the facts in Hochfelder, 
which involved Ernst & Ernst. 
3. Same Restrictions. · The Securities Industry Association 
argues that, if an implied remedy under §lO(b) is permitted, "it 
must be subject to restrictions expressly imposed by Congress." 
This seemingly straightforward solution is unsupportable. First, if 
all the procedural restrictions of §11 were appended to §lO(b), it 
would become merely a §11 action with the added requirements of 
scienter, reliance, and causation. Second, if a purchaser of 
securities sued under §lO(b) for conduct also actionable under both 
§§11 and 12(2), it would be unclear from which express remedy to 
import the procedural restrictions. 
II. Standard of Proof 
If the Court finds that there is no implied remedy under §lO(b) 
for the purchasers of securities in this case, there is, of course, 
no reason to reach the standard-of-proof issue. 
A. Issue. Pltfs contend that the CA's discussion of the 
standard-of-evidence issue in that portion of the opinion dealing 
with scienter, and the fact that the considerations supporting the 
clear-and-convincing standard are primarily relevant to scienter, 
indicate that the CA intended to instruct the DC only as to the 
7 
, 
submission on retrial of the special interrogatory regarding 
scienter. Although some of the Court's discussion certainly 
supports the pltfs' assertion, the CA did not expressly limit 
holding~ This discussion will assume 
whether pltfs must prove all elements 
clear and convincing evidence. 
B. Standards. Where, as here, neither the Constitution nor -----any federal statute requires any particular standard of proof, it 
should be presumed, deft argues, that Congress intended use of the -
traditional preponderance standard. There are two problems with 
this straightforward approach. As the P.receding section indicates, 
J~~~4~a<-~ 
implied causes of action have little to do ~ith congressional ~ 
" intent. A private §lO{b) action is meant to "supplement" the 
congressional scheme by a judicially fashioned remedy, and looking 
to congressional intent to define the elements of this federal 
common-law fraud action is disingenuous. More important to the 
inquiry here is how the express regulatory scheme coexists with the 
implied remedial scheme. 
~ Second, it is not clear what the "traditional" standard of 
~~ proof is in this area. The Court could: {1) adopt the burden of 
· ~·~ 1 ~roof that applies where fraud is an element of a claim arising 
~ under federal law in a nonsecurities case (clear and convincing); 
~~y {2) adopt the prevailing standard in the state courts {clear and 
convincing); {3) adopt the standard of proof applicable to fraud 
actions under the law of the forum state; or {4) fashion a standard 
after an analysis of the particular factors in this area of the law . 
. ,. 
14. 
1. Federal Fraud Standard. The ·preponderance of the evidence 
standard is traditionally applied in civil actions. See Addington 
v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418, 423-424 (1979). In one of its first 
opinions under the federal securities laws, SEC v. C.M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344, 355 (1943), this Court applied the 
preponderance standard to cases brought by the SEC under §17(a) of 
the Securities Act of 1933--a provision that is quite similar to 
rule lOb-5. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 767 (BLACKMON, J., 
dissenting) 
rule lOb-5) • 
(indicating that SEC put §lO(b) and 
~
Nevertheless, federal fraud cases 
1\ 
§17 together to form 
have employed a I 
clear and convincing standard, particularly when certain equitable 
relief has been sought. See, e. g., Nowak v. United States, 356 
u.s. 660, 663 (1958) (citizenship) (finding of fraud requires proof 
by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence); Pereira v. United 
States, 347 u.s. 1, 10 (1954) (indicating clear and convincing 
standard for mail fraud statute) . Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In all \ 
I 
averments of fraud ••. the circumstances constituting fraud .•• shall be 
stated with particularity.") 
~ ~ 2. Common-~ Appr~h. Some state courts have adopted the 
t 1 reponderance standard in common-law fraud cases involving 
iolations of securities or blue-sky laws. See Capital Gains, 375 
\ 1 n Y~ 
~ · u.s., at 194 ("There has ..• been a growing recognition by common-law 
-4.. ,. 
~rts that the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around 
,..---
transactions involving land ... are ill-suited to the sale of such 
intangibles as [investment] advice and securities •••• "). Even 
outside the area of securities fraud, twelve states, according to 
defts, apply the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard; twenty-six 
15. 
states and the District of Columbia the clear-and-convincing-proof 
------------~'--
standard; two states apply a "preponderance of the clear and -----
convincing proof" standard; seven states require a standard of proof 
higher than a preponderance but one not termed "clear and 
convincing"; and three states apply different standards depending 
whether the action is one at law or in equity. 
3. Law of Forum. In Hochfelder, the Court observed that, in 
the absence of legislative guidance concerning the contours of 
§lO(b) actions, the federal courts should follow the law of 
judicially implied remedies. 425 u.s., at 210 n.29. Deft argues, 
~ :::::e:~ :::t1::e0:o::: :::::ds::::tw:e:::::r:tr::e~:::::e:han 
~~litigation concerning applicable statutes of limitations has been 
h /" . 
~ . J.~onfus1ng and wasteful; there is particular difficulty with 
~~borrowing when pltfs are a class; and using the law of the forum 
~ Vl state also invites forum shopping. On the other hand, these same 
~~objections could go to the holding in Hochfelder. Moreover, it is 
Bvf' --7 standard practice for plfts in private §10 (b) actions to include a 
separate common-law fraud claim and a demand for jury trial. Use of 
the same standard of proof for both would reduce jury confusion. 
4. Fashioning a §lO(b) Standard. The function of a standard 
of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of 
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of 
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication." In re 
Winship, 397 u.s. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In 
Addington, 441 u.s., at 423 (requiring the clear-and-convincing 
standard before an individual could be confined indefinitely in a 
mental institution), the Court stated that the determination of an 
' lt " 
appropriate standard of proof requires a balancing of~ interests in 
,... ~ __......,__.... ' 
order "to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to 
indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision." 
The Court observed: 
~ ~ One typical use of the standard is in civil cases 
involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-
~~~ criminal wrongdoing by the de fendant. The interests at 
 stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial 
than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly 
reduce the risk o the defendant of havin his re utation 
tarn1s ed erroneously by 1ncreas1ng the pla1ntiff's burden 
of pro of . Simf lar iy , this Court has used the "clear, 
unequivocal and convincing" standard of proof to protect 
particularly important individual interests in various 
civil cases. [Citing Woodby v. INS, 385 u.s. 276, 285 
(1966) (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 u.s. 
350, 353 (1960) (denatural1zation); Schneiderman v. United 
States, 320 u.s. 118, 159 ~ (1943) (denaturalization)] • 
. -
441 u.s, at 424. The special measure of protection for deft at the 
cost of increased risk of error is tolerable only when the possible 
injury to deft is significantly greater than the possible harm to 
the pltf. In most civil cases, society has no interest in 
s~L5 
preferring one party or handicapping the other: Itslnt~rest is in 
maximizing the likelihood of a correct judgment. Although all of 
the considerations discussed below do not point in one direction, it 
is reasonable to conclude, as the CA did, that the interests of the 
persons charged with complicity in a fraudulent distribution of 
securities outweighs the interests of persons who purchased the 
securities, especially in light of the fact that there is 
considerable doubt that Congress intended to protect under §lO(b) 
individuals who purchase registered securities. 
17. 
a. TheCA based its conclusion, · at least in part, on the fact 
I 
that "judgment for the plaintiff detracts from defendant's 
r,eputat_ign to a far greater extent than in other civil litigation." --
Cf. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at 739 (finding the "vexatiousness" 
of §lO(b) litigation to be "different in degree and in kind" from 
that of other litigation). Pltfs argue that the possible opprobrium 
to a deft that may result from an adverse private §lO(b) decision 
clearly falls far short of the extraordinary interests that warrant 
the clear-and-convincing standard of proof, and that the interests 
of deft, who has allegedly participated intentionally in the 
fraudulent sale of securities to the public, do not outweigh the 
interests of those who purchased the securities, the very 
individuals whom the federal securities laws are intended to 
protect. Deft argues that it is a small firm of certified public 
accountants, and the effect on its reputation of a fraud judgment 
predicated on findings that it acted with intent to deceive or 
defraud investors would be ruinous. The SG argues that deft's 
~ 
general interest in protecting its reputation in a case brought 
under the federal securities laws is not substantially different 
from the interest of defts in other civil proceedings, such as 
antitrust or civil rights actions, in which violations of federal 
statutes are alleged and in which the preponderance standard 
applies. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 u.s. 252, 266-267 (1980) 
(preponderance standard applies to expatriation proceeding). 
~ C- It seems that the SG undervalues a professional's reputation. ~! 
~ v ~~ b The other reason offered by the CAS to justify imposition 
~ ~~ he. clear-and-convincing standard is that "proof of intent to 
\l~~.>;vO · 




deceive is often a matter of inference ..•• " Although theCA held 
that a clear-and-convincing standard should have been applied, it 
also held that the evidence was sufficent under that standard to 
permit a finding that each deft acted with intent to deceive. The 
CA supported its holding by references to "expert testimony that 
[deft] was, to some degree, negligent in its accounting procedures"; 
to deft's "involvement" in the preparation of the Use of Proceeds 
section of the prospectus; and to deft's refusal to give a comfort 
letter to the underwriters referring to the construction costs in 
the prospectus, a matter arguably beyond the competence of 
accountants and auditors. Deft contends that, if §lO(b) 's scienter 
requirement, cf. Hochfelder, 425 U.S., at 194 n.l2 (leaving open 
whether reckless behavior will establish liability), may be 
satisfied under a clear-and-convincing standard by so insubstantial 
a body of evidence, it is fearful to imagine the quality of evidence 
necessary to establish scienter under a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard. But cf. Vance, 444 u.s., at 267 (noting that 
pltf's duty to prove a state-of-mind element was "in itself ..• a 
heavy burden" that militates in favor of using the preponderance 
standard of proof). 
c. In addition, the CAS's decision creates somewhat of an 
,__--
anomaly when read in the light of this Court's decision in Steadman 
v. SEC, 450 u.s. 91 (1981), which held that the preponderance-of-
~-evidence standard applies in SEC administrative proceedings 
~brought pursuant to §9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and 
§203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Because the Court 
~- ~-~ ~ ~~aseu -its holding on an interpretation of §7(c) of the APA, Steadman 
is distinguishable from the present case. Nevertheless, under the 
CAS's ruling, a deft in an SEC proceed~ng would be afforded only a 
preponderance standard, but in a private §lO(b) case the same deft 
would be afforded the higher standard, even though the potential 
harm to a deft from an erroneous decision in an SEC administrative 
proceeding where his business and livelihood are at risk could be 
greater than in a private §lO(b) action. 
d. Different standards of proof for private suits and for 
agency actions may also hinder the efficient disposition of 
securities litigation by sometimes foreclosing use of the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel. In Parkline Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 u.s. 
322 (1979), this Court held that a private pltf could collaterally ~ 
estop a deft from relitigating issues previously decided in an 
action brought by the SEC. Arguably, collateral estoppel may be 
used only if the standard in the first proceeding is as stringent as 
the standard in the subsequent proceeding. 
Summary 
1. I recommend that you once again "assume" the existence of 
§lO(b) remedies for purposes of addressing the questions presented. 
2. While the existence of express remedies is compelling 
evidence that no private remedy should be implied, I believe it is a 
I I \' 
poor rationale for limiting existing implied remedies. The 
~ ~................... ..., 
rationale cannot be limited to situations where there is an express 
remedy: the existence of other remedies does not indicate 
congressional intent any more than does the absence of remedies. 
Most important, the judicial costs of deciding whether an express 
remedy is available in every §lO(b) case to eliminate only a few 
20. 
poorly pleaded cases are not justified·: ·It would not eliminate the 
case before the Court. The only principled alternatives are (1) 
reject defendant's limitation or (2) definitively state that the 
remedies available under federal securities laws are only those 
expressly created by Congress. Protection against unwarranted 
imposition of liability may be better obtained through faithful 
application of this Court's prior decisions defining the elements of 
a private §10 (b) action.(J!~. ) 
Having said that, some thought should be give to stating simply 
that there is no private §lO(b) remedy. As this case so well 
indicates, it is very difficult to "limit" the remedy once it is 
----------~~ 
assumed to exist. The area is sufficiently messy to permit you to 
say that no private §lO(b) remedy will be implied under any 
~ circumstances, and if you are so inclined, there is no better case . 
. ' P 3. It is difficult to square the limitations suggested in this 
~~t rvn case concerning who may sue, who may be sued, or what the elements 
of a private §lO(b) action may be with precedent. ~ j;>'-
4. The standard-of-proof issue is close~re ~ 
persuasive arguments on all sides. The §lO(b) remedy, however, is 
for all purposes a federal common-law fraud action. I see no reason 
why a uniform rule here is any more necessary than it would have 
been in Hochfelder and would opt for the standard of the forum 
state. If the Court decides to fashion its own standard, the 
disfavored use of private §lO(b) remedies, as well as the risk to 
reputation in any fraud case, counsel for adoption of the clear-and-
co~. ~ 





TO: Jim Browning DATE: Sept. 13, 1982 
FROM: Lewis P. Powell, Jr. 
81-680 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 
I read your excellent memorandum o'rer the weekend,~-­
and found it extremely helpful. This is an area in which I 
am particularly interested - as you know from what I have 
written in "implied action" cases. I am tentatively 
inclined to agree with you, howev~r, as to the correct 
analysis and disposition of this case. 
With respect to the "clear and convincinq" 
standard (\ol"'ich ! am inclined to think should be ado~ted as 
a federal rule), I ~ake the followinq observations -
somewh~t personal. My first exnerienc~ in corporate as 
distinguished from trial practice was in the repr~Aentation 
of Virginia investment banking firms. ! therefore have some 
familiari.ty with the Securities Acts, and Also with thf> way 
in which they have been administeren. Generally, I think 
these acts have heen amonq the best of the requlatory 
statutes. But the SEC always has sought to exoand its 
reach. The history of lOb-5 is an example. 
In balancing the "equities" or policy 
considerations relevant to the standard of proof, I also 
know from my corporate experience in the latter years of my 
practice that the increase in damaqe suits has certain 
·~ 
negative effects in addition to those identified in your 
memorandum. 
2. 
The typical private damages action under the 
Securities Acts takes place several years after the alleqed 
fraud. There are bankrupt companiP.s today that, only a year 
or two aqo, were widely viewed as fine invPstments. ~urors 
- and indeed judges - tend to be influenced by the present 
rather than conditions existing at the time of the alleged 
fraud. Information that may not. have seemed important then 
can loom quite large years l~ter. 'i'he number of suits have 
multiplied, and sometimes damaqes have been larqe and - as 
your memorandum noted - reputations destroyed. 
One consequence of all of this is that many of the 
ablest people in our country no lonqer will serve on boards 
of directors. I know thls from personal experience. l!!ven 
insurance covering directors is usually limited to 
negligence and not fraud. Premiums are high, an expense 
consumers ultimately pay. Our baste economic system - the 
free enterprise system - is a "risk" system and investors 
should not expect quaranteed equity investments in 
part i.cular. 
Against thi.s background, if the following 
information is readily obtainable on Lexis it might be 
interesting, and poss~bly relevant to the standard of proof: 
How many lOb cases have there been since Fleschman was 
decided in 1951? Has the number accelerated in recent 
years? Will Lexis identify suits filed against various 
. . 
3. 
categories of defendants: persons who sign registration 
statements, officers and directors,· underwriters, experts -
particularly accounting firms. My impression is that a good 
many small accounting firms no longer will work on 
registration statements. 
In the literature in this area, is there any 
discussion that has come to your attention as to the public 
interest that may be adversely affected by opening the field 
wide to damage suits that have never been expressly 
authorized by Congress. 
I do not want you to commit any substantial amount 






To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, No. 81-680 
You asked if in the literature there is any discussion as to 
the public interest that may be adversely affected by opening the 
securities field wide open to damage suits t~ave never been 
expressly authorized by Congress. I hope the following list 
addresses your inquiry and proves helpful. I have copies of the 
articles in my office if you wish to see any of them. 
Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 Va. L. Rev. 
553, 577-578 {1981) 
Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment 
Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 Va. L. Rev. 
776, 840-842 {1972) 
Note, Rule lOb-5: The Rejection of the Birnbaum 
Doctrine by Eason~ General Motors Acceptance 
Corp. and the Need for a New Limitation on 
Damages, 1974 Duke L.J. 610, 628-631 
7o 
job 10/31/82 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, No. 81-680 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, No. 81-1076 
You asked for statistics on: (1) the number of lOb cases 
decided since Fleschman (1951): (2) whether the number has 
accelerated in recent years: (3) who the defts were in those cases. 
The research librarian helping me on this project had hopes at first 
that this information would be available from the SEC. She has 
since learned that such is not the case. She has also informed me 
that she thinks it would be impossible to retrieve the information 
from Lex.i s. It would require a case-by-case examination of over 
1500 cases per year (in recent years). 
Do you have any suggestions? ~ ---
' . 
81-6 80 HERMAN & MacLEAN v. HUDDLESTON 
81-1076 HUDDLESTON v. HERMAN & MacLEAN Argued 11/9/82 
/~~~ 
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November ll, 1982 
81-680 Herman & ~acLean v. Huddleston 
~h-10'6 Hm::1dleston v. Herman & Maci,ean 
I have decided tentatively to re~ain out of this 
case for the following reason: 
Our oldest daughter lives in HouAton, where her 
husband is a.n officer (or partner:?} of Rotan-Mosle Co., a 
leading T~xa~ investment banking f.tr.m that has be~n 
prominent in underwriting issues related to the oil 
industry. My understan~ing is that one or more of these 
issues •went sour" with the general c·ollapae of. oil-related 
securities. 
• 
Our lfaughter has told me that her husband, 
toqether with Rotan-Mosle and I suppose other officials, are 
being sued for alleged Securities Act violations. I have 
not discussed the matter with our son-i.n-lBw, but it is Bafe 
to assume that the customary claims - similar to those in 
the above case - are being made. 
t euppos., lt is possible that pending litigation 
involving our son-in-law could be settled before our case is 
brought down. In that event, I could join in the decision 




The Chief ,Justice 
lfp/ss 
... ;. 1 
81-680 
No. 81-1076 
The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 









.§upuntt <!Jattrlaf f1r.t ~t.tb' ~brl.tg 
:Jfaglfin.gtcn. ~. OJ. 2llc?J!-' 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
December 30, 1982 
Re: 81-680 - Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston; 
and 81-1076 - Huddleston v. Herman & 
MacLean 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§eyunu <!fttttrl o-f tfrt ~uittb ~htttg 
~IUlfrin.gtott. ~· <!f. 2.(Jc?)l.' 
January 3, 1983 
Re: No. 81-680 - Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 
No. 81-1076 - Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.iutrrttttt QJL11td ttf t~ t 1!initt lt .i hdt,tt 
'J!Jia.s'qhtgton, ~. <!f. 2llgt't~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
January 10, 1983 
No. 81-680 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 
No. 81-1076 Huddleston v. Her~an & MacLean 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.prtuU Qfottrl of tltt ~b ,.:§ta!t.G 
._ufringLtn, ~. ~· 2!l?Jt~ 
January 17, 1983 
Re: 81-680, Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 




Copies to the Conference 
~u:prrntt {!fonrl of tlft ~tb ;§tatfg 
'~htilfrhtghm. ~. <i 20.?'1-~ 
CHAM!3ERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 




January 19, 1983 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean 
You said at Conference last week that it would be a close 
question whether the Chief or I were the last to join your 
opinion. I see · I now have that honor, and want to commend 
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